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This Brief is submitted by the Utility Shareholder
Association of Utah, Alex Oblad and Harold Burton, shareholders
of Mountain Fuel Supply Company, all of which are collectively
referred to herein as the "Plaintiffs", in answer to the brief
of the Utah Department of Administrative Services ("Department")
and the brief of the Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens
("Coalition") in support of their petitions for a writ of
certiorari to set aside the Report and Order issued by the
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") on
December 31, 1981 ("Order") adopting a stipulation and
agreement ("Agreement") • 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS OF THE
COALITION AND THE DEPARTMENT
It is apparent from the briefs of the Department and
Coalition that their principal objection to the Order is that
it is in violation of this Court's decision in Committee of
Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 595 P.2d 871

1 The following abbreviations are used for the
purpose of citation in this brief:
(1) "Dept. Br." refers to
the brief of the Utah Department of Administrative Services;
(2) "Coalition Br." refers to the brief of the Utah State
Coalition of Senior Citizens; (3) "Ord." refers to the Report
and Order on Stipulation and Agreement issued by the Public
Service Commission of Utah on December 31, 1981; (4) "Tr."
refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearings before the
Commission commencing October 14, 1981.
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(Utah 1979), hereinafter referred to as the "Wexpro Decision".
(Dept. Br. at 71-76; Coalition Br. at 2-23.)

2

The Department contends that the Order violates the
Wexpro Decision mandate because:

1) the Court ordered an

evidentiary hearing but the only hearing conducted by the
Commission was on the Agreement; 2)

the Court said to conduct a

hearing to classify properties as utility or non-utility, but
·.,.

there was no hearing; 3) the Court said that any transfer must
be for fair market value and in the public interest, but there
was no "reasoned determination" in that regard.
11.)

( Dept . Br . at

The Department says the Order is defective because it is

the result of a "compromise--plain and simple".

(Dept. Br. at

12.)
The Coalition objects to the Order for similar
reasons.

It says the Commission failed to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to classify properties and failed to
conduct a hearing to determine the fair market value of
properties.

(Coalition Br. at 5, 6.)

The Coalition states

that the only way to arrive at a fair market value is to place
an actual monetary value on properties transferred and that
fair market value can only be arrived at through litigation.

2

The Department contends that the Order is in
"wholesale violation" of the Wexpro Decision (Dept. Br. at
71-75.).
Likewise, the Coalition argues that the Order
"violates", and is "per se incompatible" and "inconsistent"
with the Wexpro Decision.
(Coalition Br. at 7-23.)
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_Furthermore, both the Coalition and Department assert that each
of the legal principles enunciated in the Wexpro Decision may
only be resolved through litigation.

Because an agency has a

duty to comply with a reviewing court's mandate, the Coalition
and Department argue, controversies on remand cannot be
resolved through settlement.

(Dept. Br. at 72; Coalition Br.

at 14-19.)
A common sense analysis of the arguments presented by
the Coalition and the Department points out the fallacy
therein.

For example, the Department and Coalition would have

this Commission spend its valuable time and resources
conducting a hearing to classify properties as utility or
non-utility because the Wexpro Decision under the facts then
before the Court, instructs the Commission to do so for the
purpose of determining whether or not the properties must be
transferred for fair market value.

595 P.2d at 878.

It is

obviously unnecessary for the Commission to conduct such a
hearing inasmuch as the properties which are the subject of the
Agreement are treated in the Agreement as utility properties,
i.e., all transfers are made for fair market value.

The

Department and coalition's argument that fair market value can
only be arrived at through full litigation is wholly without
foundation.

To say that adverse parties, calling upon their

own and other's expertise, cannot during the course of an
arm's-length transaction arrive at fair market value, is
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absurd.

This happens in every day business transactions

between individuals seeking to protect their personal
interests.

However, it is not necessary to debate whether or

not it was possible for the parties, through negotiations, to
determine fair market value inasmuch as the record establishes
through testimony of numerous expert witnesses that the
consideration provided for in the agreement constitutes fair
3
market value which is customary in the industry.
Furthermore, the Commission found, based on competent evidence,
that the Agreement conforms to the legal principles set forth
in the Wexpro Decision.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR BY ENTERING AN
ORDER BASED UPON A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

The thrust of the Coalition and Department's objection
to the Order is that it is based upon a settlement.

As pointed

3 Herman G. Roseman testified for the Committee and
the Division that royalty payments allowed in the stipulation
and agreement are fair market consideration which is standard .
in the industry given the difficulty and expense of determining
the actual value of oil and gas reserves.
(Tr. 1026, 1029,
1045, 1046, and 1047.) Howard Ritzma also testified for the
Division and the Committee that the consideration provided for
in the stipulation and agreement constitute fair market consideration which is customary in the industry.
(Tr. 1250, 1251,
1252) Mr. Ritzma further testified that it is essentially
impossible to arrive at the value of oil and gas in unexplored
properties and that it is not practice in the industry to
convey such properties for actual dollar values.
(Tr. 1263 and
1274). R. D. Cash, Ralph Kirsch, Lyle Hale provided similar
testimony.
(Tr. 1502, 1515, 1520, 1331, 1333 - 1335.)
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out above, that objection, on its face, is flawed.

This is

particularly true given the fact that the Commission did not
adopt the Agreement without first giving it very careful
scrutiny.

The Order contains specific findings of fact and

conclusions of law which are amply supported in the record of
the Commission proceedings, that the Agreement is in the public
interest, provides for fair market consideration and is

other~ise consistent with the Wexpro Decision. 4
Additionally, the Commission properly concluded in the Order
that it has jurisdiction to resolve the pending controversies
by negotiated settlement (Ord. at 20) and further recognized
that it was with the encouragement of the Commission, that the
parties engaged in settlement negotiations which ultimately
resulted in the Agreement.

(Ord. at 14.)

Indeed, as part of

its broad discretionary authority to regulate the business of
utilities, the Commission enjoys specific statutory authority
to resolve this and other controversies

thro~gh

settlement.

4 After eight days of hearings during which the
Commission received the evidence of renowned experts in utility
law and carefully scrutinized the Agreement, the Commission
found each aspect of the Agreement to conform with the Wexpro
Decision. Specifically, the Commission made findings of fact
that the division of properties contained in the Agreement is
for fair market value as typically determined in the industry
(Ord. at 19; Findings 10 and 11) and that the Agreement is in
the oublic interest.
(Ord. at 19.) The Commission made
simiiar conclusions of law, i.e., the Agreement is in the
public interest (Ord. at 21; Conclusions 4, 5, and 6) and that
any transfers are for fair market value.
(Ord. at 21.)

-5-
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A.

The Commission is Vested with Express
Statutory Authority to Adopt a
Settlement Agreement; the Fact that a
Controversy is Terminated by Settlement
Cannot, By Itself, Serve As the Basis
for Setting Aside a Commission Order.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (Supp. 1981) vests the
Commission with power and jurisdiction to "supervise all of the
business of every . • . public utility in this state

",

and in exercise of that authority to do all things that are
"necessary or convenient."

In carrying out its functions, the

Commission enjoys a wide latitude of discretion.

This Court

has repeatedly stressed the broad discretionary powers of the
Commission and administrative agencies generally.
Public Service Commission, 645 P.2d 600.

Williams v.

(Utah 1982); Utah Gas

Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d
530 (1967); Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299
(Utah 1979); Mantua Town v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912 (Utah 1978).
However, it is not necessary to look to the Commission's
general and broad discretionary powers to find its authority to
enter an order based upon settlement.

That authority is

expressly granted in a recent enactment of the Utah
Legislature.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-10(1)

(Supp. 1981) provides

as follows:
At anv time before or during a hearing or
proceeding before the commission the parties
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between themselves or with the commission or
any commissioner, may engage in settlement
conferences and negotiations.
The
commission may at its sole discretion adopt
any settlement proposal of the parties and
enter an order based upon such proposal if
it deems such action proper.
(Emphasis
added.)
The Legislature has further provided that "no
informality of any proceeding • . • shall invalidate any order
made by the commission."

Utah Code Ann. §

54-7-1

(Supp. 19 81) •
Thus the Utah Legislature has expressly endowed the
Commission with the authority and jurisdiction to adopt a
settlement proposal "at any time" if the Commission finds "in
its sole discretion", that the proposal is proper.

The

Legislature has not qualified its grant of authority to the
Commission with a requirement that the Commission only allow a
settlement of those matters which are not on remand from this
Court.

In fact, by statutory mandate, it is impermissible to

set aside a commission order for the simple reason that it is
based on a settlement proposal.
Where legislative intent is clear and unambiguous,
"the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce
the law according to its terms."

(Citation omitted.)

Mountain

States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah
502, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (1945).

Plaintiffs do not contend that

-7-
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in making a determination that a settlement is proper the
Commission can ignore the legal principles enunciated by this
Courts

The Commission must do so and has done so.

After eight

days of hearings and careful scrutiny of the Agreement and
examination of expert witnesses presented by the parties to the
Agreement as well as by the Coalition, the Commission found the
settlement to be consistent with and not in violation of the
legal principles set forth by this Court in the Wexpro Decision.
B.

The Function of This Court Upon Review of a
Commission Decision is to Determine Whether
or Not the Commission Regularly Pursued its
Authority; Judicial Action Cannot Supplant
the Discretionary Authority of the
Commission.

The Coalition acknowledges that the Commission has
broad statutory authority to adopt settlement proposals, but
states that that authority does not give the Commission "a
blank check to approve settlements."

(Coalition Br. at 7.)

Plaintiffs, as stated above, do not dispute that the Commission
in approving the Agreement must follow the legal principles set
forth by this Court in the Wexpro Decision.

Plaintiffs

disagree with the conclusion of the Coalition, however, that it
follows from the proposition that the Commission cannot adopt a
settlement which is incompatible with law or incompatible with
the "law of the case" that it cannot properly adopt the
Agreement.
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Simply stated, it is the function of a court to 9oint
out to an agency its legal errors, and once that agency has
corrected those errors it may proceed to carry out its
legislative charge as it chooses within the bounds of its
statutory authority.

K. Davis, Administrative Law, § 18.12

(1974); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); FPC v. Idaho
Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); ~LRB v. Food Store Employees,
417 U.S. 1

(1974).

While a lower court may be required ·to

strictly adhere to a superior court's instructions on remand,
an administrative agency is not so bound.

The reason is that

courts and agencies derive from different origins and have
diverse responsibilities.
309 U.S. at 141, 142.

FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,

The Commission, for example, is an

extension of the legislative branch of government and possesses
certain statutory prerogatives separate and distinct from the
prerogatives of the judiciary.

FCC v. Pottsville Broadcastinq

Co., 309 U.S. at 141; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 155 P.2d at 188.

The judiciary must

observe the proper distribution of powers between the
executive, legislative and judicial branch of governments and
may not usurp the discretionary authority of the Commission in
its regulation of the business of public utilities.

Utah Light

& Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118
P.2d 683 (Utah 1941).
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The cases cited by the Department and the Coalition
for the proposition that the Commission must literally comply
with the directions contained in the Wexpro Decision either
support the principle stated herein or are clearly
5
distinguishable and not applicable.
Both the Department and
the Coalition place considerable reliance in support of their
contention upon the United States Supreme Court decision, Utah
Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S.
464 (1969), wherein, in the context of anti-trust litigation,
the Supreme Court ordered the United States District Court for
the District of Utah to comply with its previous mandate that a
decree be entered requiring a company to divest itself of

5 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcastin~ Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940); Chicago and Northwestern Transpor ation Co. v. United
States, 574 F.2d 926; Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204
F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953); and City of Cleveland, Ohio v. FPC,
561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977) are cited by the Coalition in
support of its argument that the Commission must follow the
mandate of a reviewing court.
(Coalition Br. at 3-5.) Each of
these cases recognize, however, that the mandate of a court to
an agency can go no further than to point out the legal error
of the agency, leaving the agency free, once it has corrected
the error, to proceed to carry out its legislative charge.
Accord, Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2nd Cir. 1980)
(Dept. Br. at 73.) Other cases cited by the Department and
Coalition are not pertinent because they speak of the duty of a
court to respect the mandate of another court. Utah Public
Service Cornrn'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 364 (1969);
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964);
Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S.
129 (1967); Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U.S. 304
(1948); Tovrea v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 195, 419 P.2d 79
(1966) (Coalition Br. at 3, 8; Dept. Br. at 73, 74).
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another company.

In this case the Supreme Court obviously

enforced its mandate beyond the requirement that the District
Court correct its errois of law.

However, this case is not

pertinent to the pending matter inasmuch as it involves the
directions of a court to another court.

As pointed out above,

there is a great and respected distinction between the extent
to which a court can compel another court to follow
instructions on remand and- the extent to which a court can
compel an administrative agency, as an arm of the legislature,
to take specific actions which fall within its regulatory
jurisdiction.
The discrete and difterent responsibilities of the
Commission and the judiciary are found in statutory law and
have been faithfully respected by this Court.
§

Utah Code Ann.

54-7-16 (1973) provides in pertinent part that the Supreme

Court's review of a Commission decision shall "not be

~xtended

further than to determine whether the commission has regularly
pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the
order or decision under review violates any right of the
petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or the
State of Utah."

It is not within the province of the judiciary

to issue specific instructions to the Commission as to how it
must carry out its regulatory functions.

That is made clear in

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Company v. Public Service

-11-
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Commission, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184 (1945) where this Court
considered the effect of its earlier decision setting aside and
remanding an order of the CoMmission.

The Court disagreed with

the contention of the Commission that the court held in its
earlier review proceedings that certain utility charges were
discriminatory, and in so doing discussed the limited functions
of the Supreme Court in reviewing a Commission order.

The

court stated:
It is urged by the Commission that this
court did not sustain the charges made by
the utility pending review; that we in fact
held that such charges were discriminatory.
This position misconceives the function of
this court in reviewing an order of the
Commission. We, of course, in rendering our
decision, acted within the scooe of our
authority. Consequently, we determined
merely that the Commission had not regularly
pursued its authority.
Everything else
stated in our opinion was in response to
contentions of the plaintiff relative to
confiscatory rates, arbitrary action by the
Commission in respects other than those by
us sustained, etc. But because we in the
rationale of the opinion found that such
contentions should be overruled, it does not
follow that we determined that the rates
charged by the utility were unjust,
unreasonable or confiscatory. We did not so
determine simply because that is not our
function.
Indeed, it is not a judicial
function.
It is legislative and is to be
exercised by the arm of the legislature--the
Public Service Commission.
(Emphasis added.)
155 P.2d at 187, 188.
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The court noted that its limited function with respect
to Commission decisions is founded in Section 76-6-16 of the
Utah Code cited above, stating:
Ample authority exists in the Commission to
determine reasonable rates.
The authority
comes from the legislature not from this
court.
It must be clear that we did not
thus offhandedly assume authority which this
court has consistently asserted was not by
the legislature conferred upon it. Nor does
the fact that by the provisions of Sec.
76-3-1, U.C.A. 1943 every unjust and
unreasonable charge made by a utility for
services is prohibited and made unlawful,
confer authority upon this court to modify
an order of the Commission or to uphold an
order in part and set it aside in part.
This for the reason that the determination
of whether a rate or charge is unreasonable
or is unjust is placed by law in the
Commission and not in the courts.
(Emphasis
added.)
Id. at 188.
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion, made it
clear that a court reviewing does not issue instructions:
We never, by affirmance or vacation of the
Commission's order, approve or disapprove of
a rate order. We only determine whether it
has been arrived at by a regular pursuit of
the Commission's authority and whether there
is evidence to sustain it.

* * *
There is no middle ground. We cannot
modify. We cannot remand with directions to
fix a certain rate. We "set aside" which
leaves the Conmission free properly to find

-13-
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the rate level which it did not do before.
(Emphasis added.)
Id$ at 190.
Justice Wolfe stressed the importance that the
judiciary not invade the legislative realm and offered the
following guidance to his fellow members of the judiciary:
But where he does not think that reasonable
minds could differ, as on the question of
whether what we are asked to do is really
legislation, it is his duty to stay within
the province of the judiciary and restrain
from invading the province of the
legislature despite his personal longings
for a different result.
Id. at 191.

In accord, Williams v. Public Service Commmision,

645 P.2d 600 (Utah, 1982); PBI Freight Service v. Public
Service Commission, 626 P.2d 408 (Utah 1981); Utah Light &
Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118
P.2d 683 (1941)

(In reviewing an order of the Commission,

judicial action cannot supplant the discretionary authority of
the Commission); Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 80 Utah 455, 15 P.2d 358 (1932); Mulcahy v. Public
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 {1941); Union
Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102 Utah 465, 132
P$2d 128 (1942); Goodrich v. Public Service Commission, 114
Utah 296, 198 P.2d 975 (1948); Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines,
Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011 (1959).
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In its most recent discussion of the limitation of its
authority to review a Commission decision, this Court upheld
the Commission's exparte dismissal of a complaint upon its
finding that there was no violation of Utah law.

Giving due

respect to the authority of the Commission to dispose of
matters in a summary fashion, this Court stated:
These statutes enabled Industrial to
bring its complaint against the Mobile
corporations and allowed the PSC to.consider
it exparte.
Rule 13 of the PSC's Rules of
Procedure allows the Commission to dispose
of the complaint without a hearing.
Under
this rule the contesting party may lodge a
protest stating why a hearing should be held
and have the protest reviewed by the
Commission.
In this instance because it
appeared to the PSC that there was no
violation of Utah law, the Commission
concluded that a hearing on Industrial's
complaint was unnecessary and followed its
Rule 13 by dismissing the complaint.
Although Industrial petitioned for a
rehearing, it was considered by the PSC but
denied.
In so doing, the Commission acted
within the scone of its own rules and
statutory authority.
(Emphasis added.)
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 645 P.2d at 601 (Utah
1982).

The distinctions between the responsibility of the
judiciary and the Commission must be observed.

It is the

Commission's province to regulate the business of utilities and
the judiciary's function to review the lawfulness of Commission
decisions.

Just as it is not appropriate for courts to
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instruct the Commission as to what is a "reasonable rate", it
is beyond the judicial province to direct the Commission as to
how it must deal with a utility proposal for the division of
property and allocation of benefits.

That is a statutory

prerogative of the Commission subject only to the limitation
that its decision be made in the regular pursuit of its
authority.
This Court's recognition of the separate
responsibilities of the Commission and the judiciary is
important in two respects.

It is instructive as to the meaning

and operative effect of the Wexpro Decision and offers guidance
in the review of the Order which is on appeal.

It is clear

that the impact of the Wexpro Decision is to point out the
legal deficiency in the Commission's earlier order approving a
purchase and sale agreement and joint exploration agreement
between Wexpro and Mountain Fuel Supply Company, and to offer
guidance to be observed by the Commission in reconsidering
those matters.
the same.

The scope of review in the matter at hand is

This Court, however, is not asked to rule upon the

propriety of the purchase and sale agreement and joint
exploration and development agreement which were the subject of
the Commission's former order, but is asked to look at a wholly
new transaction.

The question before the court now is whether
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the Commission regularly pursued its authority in approving the
Agreement which the Commission found after eight days of
hearings and careful scrutiny to be in the public interest and
consistent with the legal principles enunciated in the Wexpro
Decision.

In making this determination, full recognition must

be given to the Utah statutory law which provides the
Commission with broad discretionary authority to adopt
settlement proposals.

The Order may not be set aside for the

sole reason that it is based on a settlement.
II.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES INVOLVING
UTILITIES ARE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED.

The Coalition and Department stress the fact that the
Agreement was entered solely for the purpose of avoiding
litigation and for that reason the Order is inherently
deficient.

(Dept. Br. at 61; Coalition Br. at 12-15.)

Plaintiffs do not contend that the termination of lengthy
litigation was not an important goal of the parties to the
Agreement.

Plaintiffs further concede that it has supported

the Agreement on the basis that stability and certainty would
at last prevail.

In fact, the importance of obtaining

certainty through a final resolution of this matter is the
subject of Plaintiffs' petition in these proceedings.

The

termination of costly litigation and the achievement of
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certainty are recognized to be important benefits of settlement
which serve the public interest and should not be denigrated in
these proceedings.
In Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 1242
(D.C. Cir. 1972), the Court refused to set aside an order of
the Federal Power Commission approving a "stipulation and
agreement" with respect to rate issues and in so doing noted
that all parties do not have to consent to a settlement if the
agency reviewing the settlement finds that its terms are
equitable.

463 F.2d at 1246.

Settlement carries a different

meaning and connotation in administrative law than it does in
court actions.

While a court resolves only those issues that

are presented by litigants and can allow the matter to be
resolved

th~ough

settlement only if all parties agree,

regulatory agencies have a broader scope of responsibility to
make decisions in the public interest.

As does Utah statutory

law, the federal law provides an administrative agency with
specific authority to resolve a matter through settlement.
Administrative Procedure Act§ 554(c)

(5

u.s.c.

§ 554 (c)}.

The Pennsylvania decision emphasized the importance of the
settlement prerogative as follows:
Only by exercising such • . . "administra~ive
settlement" procedures when called for can
the usual interminable length of regulatory
agency proceedings be brought within the
bounds of reason and the agencies'
competence to deal with them.
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Id. at 1246.
The legislative history of § 554(c) recognizes, said
the Pennsylvania court, that it is "of greatest importance to
the functioning of the administrative process" and it is
further the whole purpose of the informal settlement provision:
to eliminate the need for often costly
lengthy formal hearings in those cases
the parties are able to reach a result
their own which the appropriate agency
compatible with the public interest.

and
where
of
finds

Id. at 1247.
Settlement agreements are encouraged for the distinct
purpose of "setting rights,

[and] providing for stability in

the exercise of those rights . •

II

FPC, 373 F.2d 96, 100 (10th Cir. 1967).

Continental Oil Co. v.
Informal disposition

is the lifeblood of the administrative process.

Local 282,

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795
(2d Cir. 1964).
Cir. 1961).

Cities of Lexington v. FPC, 295 F.2d 109 (4th

Where an agency finds a settlement proposal to be

in the public interest, it need not conduct a formal hearing.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. FERC, 659 F.2d 509 (5th
Cir. 1981).
The importance of the settlement process to
administrative agencies was emphasized, and the liberality of
agency discretion in that regard was observed by the court in
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Cities of Lexington v. FPC, supra, in response to a party's
contention that the Federal Power Commission could not suspend
a rate increase and announce that a hearing would be had and
thereafter, without the unanimous consent of interested parties
adopt a settlement.

The Court stated:

[I]t goes without saying that there is no
substance to the suggestion that if the
Commission at the time of suspension
announces that a hearing will be held the
hearing must be held no matter _how futile or
unnecessary it thereafter becomes by reason
of a settlement. No court of law would
tolerate for a moment the idea that it would
be obliged to try a case that had been
assigned for hearing notwithstanding the
fact that the parties had reached a
settlement of the controversy. Much less
such a contention be considered here with
reference to the ruling of an administrative
tribunal where liberality of procedure is
essential in the interest of the disoatch of
business .
( Emphasis added . }
295 F.2d at 121.

That the law favors settlement of disputes is without
question.

Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973);

Amoco Production Co. v. FPC, 465 F.2d 1350 {10th Cir. 1972);
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 373 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1967}; Texas
Eastern Transmission Corn. v. FPC, 306 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1962).
The fact that the Agreement was entered in part to
terminate costly litigation and to provide certainty with
respect to the manner in which properties can be developed
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does not detract from the lawfulness of the Order.

The

importance of these benefits of settlement are universally
acknowledged and form the policy considerations which underlie
settlement statutes.

In enacting § 54-7-10, Utah Code Ann.

(Supp. 1981) providing for settlement, the Utah legislature
necessarily recognized that resolution of controversy through
settlement is in the public interest.

The legislature also
~

recognized that in reaching settlement parties may compromise
their views.

The Department and the Coalition's continued

negative reference to the motivations of the parties to the
Agreement is deceptive and in conflict with the law.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are in complete agreement with the
Department and Coalition that the Order should be set aside but
for.wholly different reasons.

The Utility Shareholder

Association supported the Commission's approval and adoption of
the Agreement based on its understanding that the Commission
would render an order that is final and res judicata so that
those complex and divisive issues resulting from the Wexpro
Decision can at last be put to rest.

On the other hand, the

Coalition and Department seek to invalidate the Agreement for
the purpose of extending the controversy through costly
litigation.
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The Coalition and Department state that the Commission
erred by not precisely following the mandate of this Court in
the Wexpro Decision.
followed that mandate.

In fact, the Commission precisely
In rendering the Order, the Commission

corrected the legal errors inherent in earlier proceedings
involving different transactions and exercised its statutory
prerogative to resolve the controversy through settlement.
The fact that in arriving at the Agreement, the
parties thereto may have compromised their initial positions,
does not mean that there has been a compromise of the legal
principles announced in the Wexpro Decision.

The Commission's

f indi~gs that the Agreement is consonant with the Wexpro

Decision is based upon its independent examination of the
Agreement and the evidence presented to it during eight days of
hearings.

The Coalition participated in those hearings and was

not timid in presenting its opposition to the Agreement.

The

Commission's Order is not based on a one sided view but arises
out of an adversarial proceeding.

The parties may have

compromised their positions but the Commission did not do so.
Plaintiffs recognize that this Court should perform a
substantial and meaningful review of the Order and encourages
it to do so.

Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service

Commission, 30 Utah 2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973).

However, in

conducting that review, due respect should be afforded to the
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jurisdiction and authority of the Commission to resolve
disputes through settlement.

Given the underlying and well

recognized policy considerations favoring settlement, the
Commission should be accorded the widest latitude of discretion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2W

day of

Jwij

1982.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

7

Attorneys for
Utility Shareholder
Association of Utah,
Alex Oblad and Harold Burton
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